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Despite Acqui al, Man Assigned Sex Offender Registry
Status
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD | In an April 26 ruling that received surprised comment from the media, the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a 6-1 vote a decision by Kings County Supreme Court Justice Vincent
Del Giudice to assign sufficient points under the state’s Sex Offender Registration Act to a man acquitted of
all the felony sex crimes charges against him to place him in the category of a level 2 sex offender, which
requires lifetime registration and other restrictions under SORA.
The defendant, Quinn Britton, then 44, was charged with first-degree rape, two counts of criminal sexual act
in the first degree (felony charges), and one count of second-degree sexual abuse (a misdemeanor charge).
The charges, based largely on the testimony of Britton’s teenage niece, stemmed from a Thanksgiving 2011
visit by the victim and her mother to the victim’s grandmother, who is Britton’s mother. The claim is that the
grandmother dosed off and the defendant invited the 13-year-old victim into his bedroom, where he induced
her to undress, fondled and kissed her breasts, performed oral sex on her, had penetrative sex with her, and
then had her perform oral sex on him.
The victim’s older brother testified that she came to him upset the following month and told him about the
incident, although her account on that occasion said that defendant “attempted” to have penetrative sex but
could not because his penis “wouldn’t fit.” The police were notified, and a detective made notes of statements
the defendant made after waiving his Miranda rights, but there is no signed confession and the notes differ
from the victim’s account. The only sexual acts to which the defendant clearly admitted were fondling and
kissing the victim’s breasts, the subject of the misdemeanor charge. All of the other evidence presented at
trial was circumstantial, there was no physical evidence of sexual assault, and the case came down to “she
said, he said.”
Judge points to “clear and convincing evidence” of crimes jury didn’t find
The jury struggled with the case, sending out three notes concerning deadlock — an inability to reach a
verdict — but ultimately convicted on the misdemeanor charge and acquitted on the felony charges. At the
subsequent sentencing and SORA hearing, Justice Del Giudice announced that based on the victim’s grand
jury and trial testimony, he found “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant engaged in the charged
conduct for which he had been acquitted by the jury, and assigned 25 points on the SORA scale, which put
Britton into the level 2 offender category, mandating lifetime registration and other restrictions.
On appeal, Britton protested that the acquittal meant that the jury had chosen to credit his testimony and to
reject that of the victim, so there could not be a finding of clear and convincing evidence that he committed
the charged acts.
The Appellate Division in Brooklyn, however, affirmed, noting that “clear and convincing evidence,” a civil
standard of proof, is a less demanding standard than “proof beyond reasonable doubt” required for a criminal
conviction, and that New York precedents allow judges to assign SORA points based on grand jury testimony
and trial testimony that had not convinced the jury of criminal guilt.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a one-paragraph memorandum, stating “Contrary to defendant’s argument,
his acquittal of charges at his criminal trial relating to such conduct does not foreclose the hearing court from
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that he engaged in such acts.”
The court provided no further explanation, and did not respond to the lengthy dissenting opinion by Judge
Jenny Rivera, who contended that the prosecution “failed” to meet the “heavy burden” of showing by “clear
and convincing evidence” that the defendant had engaged in the felony conduct of which he was charged but
not convicted.
“Defendant’s trial turned on competing narratives of the complainant and the defendant as the People had no
physical evidence or eyewitnesses to the crimes charged,” wrote Rivera. “Despite the acquittal of the felony
charges, the SORA court assessed defendant points for having committed the specific conduct on which these
charges were based. On the particular facts of this case, in which the only evidence of the conduct for which
defendant was assessed these points was rejected by the jury, the SORA court erred in finding clear and
convincing evidence of the alleged sexual contact. Therefore, I would reverse the order adjudicating
defendant a risk level two offender, and dissent from the majority’s contrary determination on this appeal.”
In support of her dissent, Rivera noted that cases cited by the court in support of its decision were not really
on point because they involved situations where the defendants entered guilty pleas and the record upon
which the SORA court had to rely in assigning points was necessarily based on grand jury testimony and
victim statements that were not made in court under oath and subject to cross-examination. This case is
different; the victim’s testimony was subject to cross-examination and failed to persuade the jury.
Underlying this odd situation is the absurd contention that requiring somebody to register for the Sex
Offender Registry is not “punishment,” a position that the US Supreme Court has taken in cases rejecting
constitutional challenges to state sex offender registration acts. Although New York’s SORA is not as
draconian as some other states’ registration laws, since it doesn’t impose stringent residential and
occupational restrictions, it still exposes a level 2 or 3 registrant to the risks inherent in having their name,
photograph, and contact information posted on a website accessible to the public, making them targets for
social ostracism, employment and housing discrimination, and even physical attacks, and requires them to
notify local officials should they travel or move across state lines, potentially subjecting them to the more
restrictive requirements imposed by other states.
That a man could be subjected to such requirements after a jury acquitted him of the charges on which they
are based is indeed startling, but the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Constitution requires
more in the way of due process before people can be subjected to mandatory registration.
Britton was represented on appeal by Denise A. Corsi.
